Water as a State subject under the Constitution creates structural tensions when rivers cross state boundaries, turning a shared natural resource into a zero-sum political contest.

Introduction: With water in the State List, but rivers transcending boundaries, India’s framework—Article 262 and Entry 56 of the Union List—creates a specialised but contested mechanism for dispute resolution.

Body: Article 262 empowers Parliament to adjudicate interstate river disputes and bars Supreme Court jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Inter-State River Water Disputes (ISRWD) Act, 1956 provides for tribunals (e.g., Cauvery, Krishna), while the River Boards Act, 1956 envisages basin-level management (largely underutilised). Tribunals’ awards, once notified, have the force of law. The Supreme Court has, however, played a role in enforcement and interpretation (e.g., Cauvery 2018), blurring the strict exclusion under Article 262. Recent amendments (2019) aim at a single permanent tribunal with timelines and a dispute resolution committee for pre-litigation settlement.

Despite this architecture, adequacy is questionable under climate stress. Delays in tribunal constitution and awards, lack of real-time data sharing, and weak enforcement mechanisms prolong disputes. The framework is allocation-centric, focusing on volumetric division rather than adaptive basin management. Climate change—altering rainfall patterns and increasing variability—renders historical allocations less reliable, intensifying zero-sum politics. Institutional gaps persist: absence of empowered river basin organisations, limited integration of ecological flows, and poor Centre–State coordination.

Conclusion: India needs to move from adjudication to cooperative basin governance—with real-time data systems, flexible allocation rules, empowered basin authorities, and climate-sensitive planning—so that constitutional mechanisms evolve from conflict resolution to sustainable water sharing.